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Demaranville v. Cannon Cochran Mgmt. Serv.’s, Inc., 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 35 (Sept. 5, 2019)1 
CIVIL APPEAL: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY – GENERAL 
 
Summary 
     The Court determined that the last injurious exposure rule determines the liability for 
occupational disease which is conclusively presumed to have resulted from past employment.  
Additionally, the Court held that death benefits are based on the employee’s wages earned while 
working for the employer to which the occupational disease is causally connected. 
 
Background 
     Daniel DeMaranville worked as a police officer for the City of Reno from 1969 to 1990. After 
retiring, he worked as a private security officer. Daniel died from cardiac arrest due to heart disease 
following surgery on August 5, 2012. Employers Insurance Company of Nevada (“EICON”) 
insured the City’s occupational disease claims through 2002, after which time the City self -insured 
its claims. 
     Laura DeMaranville was denied her husband’s death benefits by the City and EICON. An 
appeals officer reversed, finding that the City was liable for the benefits since heart disease was a 
compensable occupational disease for police officers under NRS 617.457 and the amount of the 
benefits was to be based on Daniel’s income from his private employer at the time of his death.2 
The district court affirmed the appeals officer’s decision as to the City’s liability but reversed as 
to the benefit amount, holding that it was to be based on Daniel’s income from the City at the time 




Substantial evidence supports the finding that Daniel died from heart disease 
 
     NRS 617.430(1) provides that when an employee dies from an occupational disease arising out 
of and in the course of employment, his dependents are entitled to compensation. Per NRS 
617.457(1) (2011) heart disease is conclusively presumed to have arisen out of and in the course 
of employment of a person who for five years or more has been employed full-time as a police 
officer in Nevada.3  
     After surgery, Daniel experienced low blood pressure and an elevated heart rate. His cardiac 
enzymes were determined to be elevated, consistent with heart damage. He suffered cardiac arrest 
and could not be resuscitated. His cause of death was certified as cardiac arrest caused by heart 
disease.  






1  By Anya Lester. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.457 (2017).  
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.430(1) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.457(1) (2011). 
The last injurious exposure rule applies in determining the liability for occupational disease 
claims for conclusively presumed disabilities. 
 
     The last injurious exposure rule places “full liability upon the carrier covering the risk at the 
time of the most recent injury that bears a causal relation to the disability.”4 The Court has 
previously applied this rule in determining liability where a claimant had successive employers 
that each could have been liable for the claim.5 The Court concluded that since Daniel’s 
occupational disease was conclusively presumed to have arisen out of his employment as a police 
officer pursuant to NRS 617.457(1) (2011) and was not shown to have arisen from later 
employment that this rule applies here.6  
     NRS 617.410 provides that compensation for an occupational disease claim must be paid by 
the insurer.7 Since Daniel’s disease is conclusively presumed to have arisen out of and in the course 
of his employment with the City, the last injurious exposure rule provides that liability for his 
death benefits falls on the City’s insurer at the time that Daniel worked for the City. In 1990 when 
Daniel had his last injurious exposure to the risk causally connected to his disease, EICON was 
the City’s insurer and is therefore liable for the death benefits.  
 
The occupational disease death benefit amount is based on the wages earned during the period 
causally connected to the occupational disease 
 
     NRS Chapter 617 does not provide a method for determining the amount of the death benefit. 
Per NRS 616.505(1)-(2) a surviving spouse may recover 66 2/3 percent of the decedent’s monthly 
wage.8 This amount is determined pursuant to NAC 616C.435(1)(8) by considering the employee’s 
earnings from a period of twelve weeks “ending on the date on which the accident or disease 
occurred, or the last day of the payroll period preceding the accident or disease if this period is 
representative of the average monthly wage.”9  
     Since the date that a disease “occurred” is not as discernable as the date of an accident or injury, 
the Court looked to the legislative intent to determine the calculation of the benefit. Since the NRS 
provides that dependents are to receive death benefits, the Court determined that basing Daniel’s 
death benefits on his wages from the City at the time of his death, which were zero, would nullify 
any claim and thus be inconsistent with legislative intent. The Court concluded that the legislative 
intent supported that the death benefit should be related to the wage earned at the time the 
occupational disease causally connected to the disability occurred. Therefore, to determine 
benefits, Daniel’s 1990 wages from the city should be relied upon.  
      
EICON has not shown a due process violation 
 
     EICON claimed that the Court violated its right to due process in limiting its participation to 
that of a respondent. Since EICON had notice and an opportunity to be heard on Daniel’s death 
benefit claim, the Court held that a due process violation was not shown to have occurred.  
 
4  State Indus. Ins. Sys. V. Jesch, 101 Nev. 690, 696, 709 P.2d 172, 176 (1985). 
5  Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Nev. V. Daniels, 122 Nev. 1009, 1016–17, 145 P.3d 1024, 1029 (2006).  
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.457(1) (2011). 
7  NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.410 (2017).  
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 616C.505(1)-(2) (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 617 (2017). 
9  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 616C.435(1), (8) (2016). 
 
Conclusion 
     The Court determined that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Daniel died from 
compensable occupational heart disease and affirmed the district court’s conclusion supporting the 
appeals officer’s finding. The Court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the City was the 
liable insurer. The Court also reversed the district court’s conclusion that the death benefit amount 
should be based on Daniel’s 2012 wages rather than his 1990 wages from the city.  
